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THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE NCAA’S
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT
TAYLOR SKAGGS

INTRODUCTION
The NCAA is violating § 2 of the Sherman Act by maintaining its monopoly
power through an exclusionary scheme.1 This article analyzes the NCAA’s
exclusionary conduct and the unique structure of the NCAA’s “student-athlete”
model. Whether the NCAA as an entity qualifies as a single entity with unitary
decision-making and aggregate economic power, or as a combination of
multiple entities conspiring together,2 the end result is the same. Under either
conception of the entity structure or either section of the Sherman Act, the
underlying acts taken by the NCAA violate federal antitrust law. This article
will follow a standard § 2 monopolization theory and will propose viable
alternatives for the NCAA’s current model that emphasize the anticompetitive
nature of the NCAA’s tactics.
Under the Grinnell monopolization test, a firm that possesses monopoly
power and uses exclusionary acts to maintain that monopoly power has violated
§ 2 of the Sherman Act.3 Here, the NCAA has used exclusionary acts to set its
labor costs unreasonably low in order to maintain a monopoly on the college Taylor Skaggs is an associate at the New York office of Seward & Kissel LLP in their Corporate Finance
department. He graduated cum laude from Boston University School of Law, and holds a bachelor's degree in
Economics and a bachelor's degree in English Writing from the University of Pittsburgh.
1
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2020) (defining exclusionary scheme as “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”).
2
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 193 (2010) (holding that NFL teams, while all
part of a larger consortium, are independent actors and thus can conspire amongst themselves to violate
antitrust laws).
3
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
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level athlete market. Labor costs for the purposes of this paper are defined as
the amount of compensation paid (including injury-liability avoided) to collegelevel athletes, which are athletes of the requisite age and skill necessary to
compete in college basketball and football. As such, the NCAA has created an
exclusionary scheme whereby the NCAA depresses the labor costs that would
otherwise be due in a competitive market through predatory tactics, eliminating
competitors from the market, and the NCAA recoups monopoly profits through
the maintenance of its monopoly power.
I. THE NCAA’S COST SCHEME CONSTITUTES AN EXCLUSIONARY ACT IN
VIOLATION OF THE GRINNELL MONOPOLIZATION TEST
The traditional framework for a § 2 monopolization claim can be found in the
Grinnell case, where the Supreme Court held that
the offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.4
This paper will analyze the monopolization test by examining a unique
exclusionary cost scheme: the NCAA, through exclusionary tactics, has made
its labor cost so unreasonably low that no competitor paying market wages can
compete with the NCAA in the college-level athlete market, thereby eliminating
competition and ensuring maintenance of monopoly power and profits.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that as a general rule, lower production
costs “either reflect[] the lower cost structure of the alleged [monopolist], and
so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a
judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling
legitimate price cutting.”5 Similarly, the Court has steadfastly held that price
discrimination is often a natural part of “vigorous competition” and “to hold that
the antitrust laws protect competitors from the loss of profits due to such price
competition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices
in order to increase market share.”6 However, the general rule that lower
production costs merely reflect a lower cost structure only applies to firms that
4

Id.
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (referring to P.
Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 720c (Supp. 1992)).
6
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986).
5
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can improve their production costs through better management or improved
efficiency. Here, the NCAA does not manufacture or produce physical goods;
there is no technological advancement or efficient technique that it has
implemented to lower costs. Rather than the result of “growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident,”7
the NCAA’s minimal labor costs merely reflect the use of exclusionary acts.
The NCAA’s unreasonably low costs are not legitimate price competition and
result from predatory tactics that allow the NCAA to not pay its labor a
reasonable market rate.
As the Department of Justice points out, the purpose of § 2 of the Sherman
Act is to promote economic growth and societal wealth.8 As such,
monopolization claims run the risk of punishing efficient firms that have gained
market share from inefficient rivals.9 However, the NCAA, through its
exclusionary cost structure, has created the type of harmful monopoly, with high
monopoly prices and reduced supply, that the Sherman Act aims to prevent.10
In other words, the NCAA’s monopoly has arisen and been maintained by
exclusionary tactics rather than vigorous competition or efficient operations.
A. The NCAA’s Unreasonably Low Labor Costs Allow the NCAA to
Undermine Potential Competitors’ Price and Constitute an Exclusionary
Act that Eliminates Competition in the Market
Showing antitrust harm is “not met by inquiring only whether the defendant
has engaged in ‘unfair’ or ‘predatory’ tactics. Such conduct may be sufficient to
prove the necessary intent to monopolize, which is something more than an
intent to compete vigorously . . . .”11 Similarly, low costs that are set as “an act
of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without
more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.”12 The purpose of the
Sherman Act is concerned “with the protection of competition, not
competitors.”13 In short, antitrust injury is an “injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent. . . . The injury should reflect the anticompetitive
effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation.”14
7

Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571.
U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT AND SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: AN OVERVIEW (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-1
(updated June 25, 2015).
9
Id.
10
See id.
11
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993).
12
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993).
13
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
14
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
8
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Here, the NCAA has created a pool of functionally free labor through its
exclusionary scheme,15 which allows the NCAA complete dominance of the
college-level athletics market. As a result, both the requisite exclusionary
conduct and subsequent harm to competition exists in the relevant market (i.e.,
college-level basketball and football). As a factual matter, no other entity
supplies college-level athletics to consumers; the NCAA is, both literally and
figuratively, the only game in town. More specifically, the NCAA is a
monopsony, and the NCAA’s restriction on college-level athlete compensation
reduces competition in the market, causing antitrust harm.16 Other entities exist
in the high school (pre-college) athletics market.17 Likewise, competitors exist
in the professional (post-college) athletics market.18 However, in the collegelevel athletics market, no other competitors exist, nor can any competitors enter.
Consider the plight of a potential competitor (e.g., public sports-apparel
companies like Nike, Adidas, or Under Armour) that attempts to enter the
market. Potential competitors cannot force college-level athletes to work for
free.19 Nor is it reasonable to expect college-level athletes to voluntarily work
for a sports-apparel company without pay. As an anecdotal case, New Balance,
a private footwear company, recently agreed to pay a highly-recruited collegelevel basketball player $1 million for a three-month internship to not play
basketball at all.20 Consequently, a competitor will have to compensate athletes
for their services. As the recent college basketball scandal has shown, certain
college-level basketball players are worth at least $100,000, as well as risking
the potential negative consequences from NCAA sanctions and criminal bribery
charges, for one year of play.21 Regardless of the exact determination of what
constitutes a reasonable market rate for college-level basketball and football
players, that compensation will undoubtedly be greater than zero.
Under basic economic theory, a profit-maximizing company in a competitive
market will set its price no lower than its cost. 22 At any valuation of a collegeSee infra pp. 11–16 (discussing NCAA’s free labor pool in depth).
See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2015).
17
See History, Heritage & Tradition, MCDONALD’S ALL AM., https://www.mcdonaldsallamerican.com/aag/enus/history.html (last visited July 5, 2020) (explaining the history of the McDonald’s All American high school basketball
competition); History, UNDER ARMOUR FOOTBALL, http://uafootball.us/all-america-football-game/#history (last visited
July 5, 2020).
18
The National Basketball Association and the BIG3 compete in professional American basketball. At the time this paper
was written, the National Football League and the Arena Football League were competitors in professional American
football. Arena Football has since filed for bankruptcy. Scott Gleeson, Arena Football League Files for Bankruptcy, Ceases
All Operations, USA TODAY (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2019/11/27/arena-football-leaguedeclares-bankruptcy-shuts-down/4322126002/.
19
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
20
Marc Stein, A New Option for NBA Prospects: The Million Dollar Intern, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/sports/darius-bazley-g-league-new-balance.html.
21
See Matt Norlander, Ultimate College Basketball Corruption Scandal Primer, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 12,
2018), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/ultimate-college-basketball-corruption-scandalprimer-explaining-the-latest-with-the-fbi-probe/.
22
KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 9–12 (2003).
15
16
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level athlete’s market wage rate, the potential competitor’s labor cost (defined
as Cx) will be higher than the NCAA’s labor cost (defined as Cy) because of the
fundamental fact that Cx > 0, whereas Cy ≈ 0. As soon as a competitor enters
the market, setting its price (defined as Px) equal to Cx, the NCAA can simply
lower its price (defined as Py) to any amount marginally less than its
competitor’s price. Due to the NCAA’s labor cost structure (Cy ≈ 0), it will still
make a profit at any Py > 0 and eventually drive the competitor out of business.
Once the competition has exited, the NCAA can simply return Py to the highest
monopoly price it can obtain. Even if a competitor were to forego short-term
profitability in an attempt to increase market share by setting Px = Py, the end
result would be the same. So long as Cx > Px but Py > Cy, the NCAA will
continue to turn a profit at any short-term price level that the competitor chooses.
Therefore, no competitor can or will enter the market due to the NCAA’s cost
scheme, and the NCAA can maintain a monopoly price indefinitely.
Competition in the college-level athletics market is clearly eliminated by the
NCAA’s exclusionary tactics. However, the next question is whether such an
exclusionary cost scheme as laid out above actually harms consumers of college
athletics. Do consumers actually pay more for college basketball and football as
a result of the NCAA’s low-cost scheme? The answer, under any reasonable
point of view, must be yes.
B. Presence of Competitors in the Market Reduces Price for Consumers While
Simultaneously Increasing Compensation for College-Level Athletes
The Supreme Court has held that “[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless
of how those prices are set,”23 and “depriving consumers of the benefits of lower
prices . . . does not constitute sound antitrust policy.”24 In order “to be
condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an ‘anticompetitive
effect.’ That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm
consumers.”25 The purpose of the Sherman Act is designed “not against conduct
which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends
to destroy competition itself.”26 In essence, an antitrust claim “must demonstrate
that the monopolist's conduct harmed competition, not just a competitor.”27
Here, the NCAA’s exclusionary tactics result in unreasonably low labor costs,
but those lower costs are not passed on to the consumer in the form of a lower
price while simultaneously maintaining the NCAA’s monopoly power.
23
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (quoting Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 329, 340 (1884)).
24
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 319 (2007) (quoting Brooke
Grp., 509 U.S. at 224).
25
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
26
Spectrum Sports Inc., v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
27
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 59.
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Though the NCAA is a non-profit organization,28it is most definitely not a
charity. The NCAA is a profit-maximizing entity; it will set its price at the
highest profit-maximizing level. Consider, as an example, the NCAA’s sale of
media rights for the men’s annual championship basketball tournament. The
NCAA recently extended its contract with two media companies, Columbia
Broadcasting System and Turner Broadcasting System, by eight years for a total
of $8.8 billion (starting in 2024) for the rights to broadcast the tournament.29 No
other entity can offer college-level basketball to consumers, but there are
numerous media conglomerates willing to purchase the media rights for NCAA
basketball. No serious argument can be made that the NCAA sold its men’s
basketball tournament rights to the lowest bidder; it clearly sold at the highest
price offered. However, the question remains whether competitors offering
college-level athletics would have lowered that sale price and subsequent cost
to consumers. Such a determination can only be theoretical and counter factual,
but the answer must be yes.
Economic theory posits that the presence of competitors reduces the power
of the monopolistic firm to set a monopoly price level by providing alternatives
for the buyer.30 In the face of competitors offering supply-side substitution, the
monopolistic firm would be constrained from setting its price too high lest the
buyers switch to the competitors.31 Regardless of the NCAA’s underlying cost
structure, new competitors will at least cause a marginal decrease in price as a
hedge against consumers substituting one product (NCAA basketball or
football) for a potentially cheaper alternative (Nike basketball or Under Armour
football).
Similarly, the practical implications of competitors in the market suggests
that the NCAA would have to reduce its price. If competitors enter the market,
one can assume that the NCAA’s monopoly power and exclusionary cost
structure has dissipated and college-level athletes are now receiving market
compensation for their services. In essence, there can be no competitors while
the NCAA maintains its free labor source (as examined in the preceding
section); therefore, the presence of competitors implies the absence of the
NCAA’s free labor pool. In such a scenario, the NCAA’s cost has increased to
the market rate, but an increase in labor cost does not imply a higher price to
consumers. An increase in labor cost would lead to an increase in price only
when that cost increase exceeds the market price level. Rather, the presence of
competitors would merely force the NCAA to forego its monopoly profits
through an increase in labor cost to the market rate and a reduction from the
28

Finances, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances (last visited July 5, 2020).
Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Extends Basketball Deal with CBS Sports and Turner Through 2032, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-extends-basketball-dealwith-cbs-sports-and-turner-through-2032.html.
30
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 52.
31
See HYLTON, supra note 22, at 232–36.
29

SKAGGS – ARTICLE 31.1

2020]

12/17/2020 8:52 PM

NCAA’S VIOL AT ION OF T HE SHERMAN ACT

113

monopolist price to the competitive price level. Without a price reduction, the
new competitors, who are operating at some price level less than the monopoly
price charged by the NCAA, would siphon some, if not all, the business of the
broadcasting companies. Given that the NCAA’s annual labor cost for collegelevel athletes is functionally zero and it sold the media rights for an annual
tournament at a rate of $1.1 billion per year,32 there is an enormous amount of
monopoly profits to spread around and increase labor costs while
simultaneously reducing sale price.
Per the NCAA’s 2017 Financial Report, the total amount in expenses
(excluding labor of the athletes, which naturally does not appear as an expense)
required to operate all of its athletic infrastructure across all sports and for the
entire fiscal year was $396 million.33 The amount of revenue derived from the
sale of media rights and merchandise for the annual, month-long NCAA
basketball tournaments was $981 million.34 That leaves $585 million of
monopoly profits leftover from the current exclusionary cost structure.
Moreover, sixty-eight college teams participated in the 2016 NCAA
tournament.35 The NCAA allows thirteen scholarships (covering cost of
attendance) to each of those teams.36 Together, that results in 884 college-level
athletes competing in the tournament. The average cost of attendance (tuition,
fees, room and board) for all four-year universities during the 2015-2016
academic year was calculated at $27,213.37 Altogether, the 884 athletes received
scholarships worth just north of $24 million to compete in a tournament that
generated the NCAA $585 million in profit. In other words, an entity “is a
monopolist if it can profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive
level. . . . Where evidence indicates that a firm has in fact profitably done so,
the existence of monopoly power is clear.”38
Given the astronomically high profits derived by the NCAA under its current
exclusionary cost structure, the presence of competitors and the payment of
32

See supra text accompanying note 29
See NCAA, NCAA CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2016–17 AND INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT
5 (2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20181221210506/https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2016-17NCAAFin_
FinancialStatement_20180129.pdf. The report lists total expenses at about $956 million, but that includes roughly $560
million of Distribution to Division I Members. Sharing the monopoly profits with member universities, while an expense
for accounting purposes, is not the type of expense one would usually consider when looking at production costs. Thus,
the $560 million was subtracted from the total, resulting in $396 of actual expenses.
34
Id. The financial report included certain items (specifically, Investment income - net, Gain - Other, and
Contributions) that are revenue for accounting purposes, but not useful in determining revenue from the
production of goods and services. The $981 million figure reflects the removal of these items from the total
revenues listed in the report.
35
See Division I Men’s Basketball, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.com/brackets/basketball-men/d1/2016 (last
visited July 5, 2020).
36
NCAA, 2018-19 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 15.5.5.1 (2018) [hereinafter NCAA 2018-19 DIV. I
MANUAL].
37
See Tuition Costs of Colleges and Universities, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATISTICS,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76 (last visited July 5, 2020) [hereinafter Tuition Costs].
38
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
33
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market rate wages to athletes would not increase the price to consumers.
Similarly, the price of the media rights would undoubtedly drop given the
supply-side substitution risk that competitors present to the NCAA. The lower
price of media rights subsequently reduces the price paid by consumers,
operating under a chain of reasoning where the lower price for media rights
means lower cost to broadcasting companies, which reduces the price of
purchasing the broadcast for the average consumer.39
C. The NCAA Currently has Monopoly Power in the College-Level Athlete
Market
The monopolization prong from the Grinnell monopolization test requires a
showing of monopoly power in the relevant market.40 The Supreme Court
defines “monopoly power as ‘the power to control prices or exclude
competition.’”41 “When a product is controlled by one interest, without
substitutes available in the market, there is monopoly power.”42 In scenarios
“where the market is highly diffuse and competitive, or where new entry is
easy,” monopoly power is unlikely to occur.43
Little argument can be made that NCAA does not have monopoly power in
the college-level athletics market. The Supreme Court explicitly held that the
NCAA has market power in the relevant market:
As a factual matter, it is evident that [the NCAA] does possess
market power . . . intercollegiate football telecasts generate an
audience uniquely attractive to advertisers and that competitors
are unable to offer programming that can attract a similar
audience. These findings amply support [the] conclusion that
the NCAA possesses market power.44
No other entity provides a venue for college-level athletes to perform, and
consequently, no entity can offer broadcast rights or otherwise compete with the
NCAA. Rather than a diffuse market with readily available substitutes, the
college athletics market is concentrated in one entity, the NCAA. Questions
remain whether the short-run cost of the NCAA’s exclusionary scheme can be
39
This chain of reasoning relies upon basic supply and demand economic theory, but given the reputations
of the cable conglomerates, it is unclear whether a decrease in the cost of purchasing a particular media right
would actually result in lower cost to the subsequent consumers. This paper assumes that cable companies
operate like normal firms in a competitive market.
40
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
41
Id. at 571 (quoting United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).
42
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 394.
43
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993).
44
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984).
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borne by the NCAA and whether it can maintain its monopoly power through
the imposition of barriers to entry on competitors and switching costs on
college-level athletes.
1. The “Student-Athlete” Model Allows the NCAA to Create a Functionally
Free Pool of Labor, Eliminating Short-Term Costs Associated with an
Exclusionary Scheme
The term “student-athlete” was coined by the first director of the NCAA,
Walter Byers, in an effort to avoid the classification of the relationship between
athletes and universities as an employee-employer relationship.45 The ability of
the NCAA to classify college-level athletes as non-employees has three
consequences that allows the NCAA to create an exclusionary cost scheme at
minimal or no cost to itself.
First, the employee-employer relationship has a great deal more protection
than the “student-athlete” relationship, and the NCAA can avoid paying
workers’ compensation to its athletes as a result.46 The amount of labor cost
avoided by the “student-athlete” model is incalculable, but a few numbers to put
the potential injury cost in perspective can be instructive. Since 2000, thirty
college-level athletes have died while participating in NCAA football
programs.47 From 2000 to 2016, eighty-five athletes have died while
participating across all NCAA athletic programs.48 From 2004 to 2009, the
NCAA calculated that 41,000 injuries occurred in football alone.49 The severity
and extent of those injuries will obviously vary, but the sheer scale of injuries
as well as the persistent risk of death in football alone suggests that the NCAA
has successfully avoided massive workers’ compensation liability. As such, the
NCAA has minimized its labor cost and subsequently minimized the burden of
enacting its exclusionary cost scheme.
Second, the term “student-athlete” allows the NCAA to apply its “principle
of amateurism” to college-level athletes who participate in NCAA athletic

45
Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/?single_page=true; See Jason Belzer,
Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes or Employee Athletes?, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013),
https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jasonbelzer/2013/09/09/leveling-the-playing-field-student-athletes-or-employee-athletes/.
46
See Branch, supra note 45; Belzer, supra note 45.
47
Erik Lief, 30 NCAA Football Players Have Died During Workouts Since 2000, HBO Reveals, AM.
COUNCIL SCI. & HEALTH (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.acsh.org/news/2018/09/28/30-ncaa-football-playershave-died-during-workouts-2000-hbo-reveals-13456.
48
Brian Burnsed, The Breaking Point, NCAA (2018), http://www.ncaa.org/static/champion/the-breakingpoint/.
49
NCAA, FOOTBALL INJURIES, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/NCAA_Football_Injury_WEB.pdf (last
visited Dec. 12, 2020).
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programs.50 The Supreme Court has ensconced the supposed virtues of NCAA
amateurism in the dicta of the Board of Regents case:
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered
tradition of amateurism in college sports. There can be no
question but that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or that
the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds
richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely
consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.51
The Court has rationalized the latitude provided to the NCAA to preserve
amateurism and the “student-athlete” model by assuming (without any deeper
analysis) “that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable
means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore
procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate
athletics.”52 Regardless of the soundness of the legal reasoning (or lack thereof)
and the factual realities of college athletics in 1984, the NCAA now presides
over a billion-dollar industry. Nonetheless, the NCAA can continue to classify
college-level athletes as non-employee amateurs and use any means to preserve
the “revered tradition of amateurism.” As such, the NCAA has complete control
and an unfettered ability to regulate college-level athletes’ compensation while
still remaining “entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.” The
Court’s “respect for the NCAA's historic role in the preservation and
encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics”53 allows the NCAA to
utilize a conception of amateurism that has rather nefarious consequences. As
the Court-sanctioned safeguard of noble amateurism, the NCAA can use any
tactics necessary to maintain amateurism while also wielding the power to
define that very same principle. For the NCAA, amateurism supposedly means
college-level athletes are “motivated primarily by education and by the physical,
mental and social benefits to be derived.”54 In reality, the NCAA’s principle of
amateurism is really an analysis of whether an athlete has competed with
professionals, engaged representation on his behalf, or been paid for his
services, with no consideration of whether the individual in question is
motivated by physical or social benefits, nor whether the athlete’s primary
motivation was for a professional career.55 In essence, the NCAA sets the
distinction between professional athletes and amateur “student-athletes” on
whether or not that athlete receives compensation for their efforts. The act of
50

See Branch, supra note 45; Belzer, supra note 45.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
Id. at 117.
53
Id. at 101.
54
NCAA 2018–19 DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 36, art. 2.9.
55
Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/amateurism (last visited July 5, 2020).
51
52
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refusing to pay wages to athletes is thus turned into a virtue in service of the
noble principle of amateurism. That conception of amateurism is particularly
peculiar when compared to the Greek origin of the amateur athlete. Amateur
athletes in Greece competed exclusively for prizes; there was no distinction
between professional athletes and amateur athletes because the two ideas, as
understood in modern times, were one and the same in ancient Greece.56
However, since the NCAA has control over defining what constitutes an
amateur and whether a college-level athlete satisfies those standards, the NCAA
can (and does) prescribe the amount of wages that college-level athletes can
receive and still be considered amateurs.57 Unsurprisingly, the amount of wages
a college-level athlete can receive is zero.58 Query whether profiting from the
labor of college athletes who are barred from receiving remuneration is the type
of exploitative conduct that the NCAA ostensibly strives to protect studentathletes from: “Student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.”59
Third, the amount of “compensation” the NCAA permits for college-level
athletes does not actually result in a labor cost on the NCAA. The NCAA allows
its member institutions to distribute a “grant-in-aid” to its athletes, which is
equal to the financial aid cost of attendance limitation of the member university
(i.e., tuition, fees, and room and board).60 As mentioned above, the average cost
of attendance across four-year universities, and therefore the average
compensation to college-level athletes, was $27,213 in 2016.61 Even if $27,213
was considered a fair market wage and consistent with a perfectly competitive
college athletics market, that grant-in-aid allowed by NCAA regulations is
neither practical compensation for the athletes nor does it actually result in
equivalent labor costs to the NCAA. In other words, the grant-in-aid does not
functionally increase the NCAA’s labor costs above zero.
Consider the plight of a “student-athlete” under the NCAA’s current model
at the University of Alabama (“Bama”).62 The grant-in-aid allowable under
NCAA regulations for Bama athletes is either $31,080 (in-state) or $51,424
(out-of-state).63 Per NCAA rules, Division I football programs are allowed a

56
See generally Robert Lemons, Amateurism and College Athletics (April 28, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript),https://economics.sites.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9386/f/publications/robertlemonshonorst
hesis-may2014.pdf.
57
NCAA 2018–19 DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 36, art. 12.02.10.
58
Id. art. 12.02.11.
59
Id. art. 2.9.
60
Id. art. 12.01.4.
61
Tuition Costs, supra note 37.
62
The University of Alabama has a very large and profitable football program with publicly-available
financial data. As such, it makes a good case study for the paper, but any public Division I member university
would suffice.
63
Cost of Attendance, UNIV. ALA., https://financialaid.ua.edu/cost/ (last visited July 8, 2020).
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maximum of eighty-five scholarship players.64 Even if every Bama football
athlete was an out-of-state student, the total amount of grant-in-aid given to
those players would be $4.37 million. However, Bama does not actually bear
the cost of those scholarships. Per the 2017 financial report, Bama reported $483
million of tuition and fees net revenue.65 That revenue surplus accounts for just
over $237 million of scholarship expenses for all of its students (undergraduate
and post-graduate).66 In the same year, Bama reported $243 million in state
appropriations, federal grants, and gifts, as well as an additional $24.5 million
of scholarship operating expenses.67 All but $19 million of Bama’s entire
scholarship expenses could be covered by third-party entities. Even where the
scholarship expenses are not directly covered by a third-party, Bama can recoup
the lost income from a scholarship by simply admitting additional nonscholarship students, or conversely, reducing the scholarship amounts it would
have otherwise given to non-athletes. Per the same report, Bama had a full-time
enrollment of 35,120 students.68 Given that Bama’s full allotment of football
and basketball grant-in-aid scholarships is ninety-eight (thirteen for basketball,
eighty-five for football), Bama need only admit ninety-eight additional students
(an enrollment increase of 0.28%), with no scholarship allowances to erase the
lost tuition revenue from the grant-in-aid scholarships.69 The actual labor cost
borne by the NCAA and its member institutions is functionally zero as thirdparty entities or enrollment adjustments disburse the cost. Put another way, the
grant-in-aid scholarships result in an actual cost to the NCAA or its member
universities only when those scholarship costs are not passed on to a different
entity (the state government) or group (non-scholarship students).
As an analogy, consider what the “grant-in-aid” actually offers college-level
athletes. Granting a full scholarship with sticker value of $27,000 to the
“student-athlete” is similar to giving an athlete a retail gift card for $27,000.
Yes, the gift card has a nominal value of $27,000, but the athlete can only use
that money at the specific retailer, or in this case, paying the cost associated with
attending an NCAA university. Since attending a member university is a prerequisite for competing in college athletics, the NCAA has created a system that
requires college-level athletes to pay $27,000 to participate, then generously
allows the member universities to cover that required expense. To highlight the
absurdity, consider the scholarship-as-compensation model in an employee64

NCAA 2018-19 DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 36, art. 15.5.6.1.
See UNIV. ALA., 2016–17 FINANCIAL REPORT 21 (2018),
https://finance-estus.fa.ua.edu/FinancialAccounting/FAPPub/UA%20Financial%20Reports/ua-financialreport%201617.pdf.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 19.
69
Of course, the expenses for Bama would technically increase, but it is safe to assume that those increases
would be marginal given that most of a university’s expenses are relatively fixed and do not vary greatly when
a small number of additional students are enrolled.
65
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employer context. An employer offers a potential employee a $27,000 salary.
However, the employer informs the employee that working at the office requires
a $27,000 annual workplace fee. Since the potential employee does not have
$27,000, the employer offers to cover that $27,000 fee via a salary advance. The
employee accepts the offer, and the employee now works the rest of the year for
no pay since he’s already received his $27,000 salary upfront to cover the annual
workplace fee. Has that employee “earned” $27,000? Of course not, and neither
have the student-athletes.
In any event, the NCAA has created a pool of labor outside the protections
and obligations of the typical employee-employer relationship, gained control
over what constitutes an eligible amateur athlete with the Supreme Court’s
blessing, and passed along any remaining labor costs to other entities. As such,
the NCAA has minimized the compensation and wages it owes to college-level
athletes, thereby reducing the costs of implementing its exclusionary cost
scheme to zero while still, in fact, turning a profit from its exclusionary conduct.
2. NCAA Regulations Create an Insurmountable Barrier to Entry for
Competitors While Simultaneously Prohibiting Exit by Participating
College-Level Athletes Through Enormous Switching Costs
In order for monopoly power to be maintained and monopoly price level kept
intact, the monopolist must impose entry barriers to bar competitors from
entering the market. “[W]ithout barriers to entry it, would presumably be
impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time.”70 Entry
barriers can be any “factors (such as certain regulatory requirements) that
prevent new rivals from timely responding to an increase in price above the
competitive level.”71 Furthermore, barriers to entry can exist where the
dominant firm in the market makes entry by new competitors so prohibitively
expensive as to completely dissuade competitors from attempting to enter the
market.72
The NCAA has developed a regulatory scheme that prevents competitors
from undercutting the NCAA’s monopoly price by imposing an insurmountable
cost on entry. For example, the NCAA demands that all “student-athletes” that
compete for the member institutions must abide by the NCAA regulations
regarding benefits and awards in order to maintain eligibility. 73 The NCAA
model formally sets these restrictions to delineate between amateur athletics and

70

Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 n.15 (1986).
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
72
See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967).
73
NCAA 2018–19 DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 36, art. 1.2(b)–(c), (f).
71
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professional,74 but the functional distinction between amateur and professional
athlete is whether or not an individual receives wages. More specifically, the
NCAA sets out a list of permissible benefits that “student-athletes” are allowed
to obtain while maintaining their amateur status, which does not include
wages.75 The manual notes that any “student-athlete” who receives
compensation for his athletic production has become a professional athlete and
is no longer eligible to compete in the collegiate model.76 According to the
NCAA, compensation for labor is by its very nature professional and
consequently makes any athlete ineligible to compete in NCAA athletics.77 As
such, any athlete who receives any “award, benefit or expense allowance not
authorized by NCAA legislation renders the student-athlete ineligible for
athletics competition in the sport for which the improper award, benefit or
expense was received. If the student-athlete receives an extra benefit not
authorized by NCAA legislation, the individual is ineligible in all sports.”78
How then can a competitor enter the market? Theoretically, a competitor
could offer any number of college-level athletes or future college-level athletes
(i.e., high school students) compensation and start the hypothetical Fair
Compensation League (“FCL”). From the outset, the potential competitor faces
two problems. As examined earlier, the NCAA has minimal labor costs, so the
FCL now must compete with the NCAA on uneven ground. Since the FCL pays
its players and the NCAA does not, the barrier to entry for the FCL are the very
wages that the FCL must pay to college-level athletes in order to enter the
market. Rather than attempting to compete against a firm with similar costs, the
FCL will have to bear the upfront cost of paying athletes and continue to pay
those athletes for the duration of their services. At no point in time will the FCL
have lower labor costs than the NCAA, and no matter what price the FCL
attempts to sell at, the NCAA will earn a higher profit. As such, the barrier to
entry is both enormously costly and never dissipates; by paying wages, the FCL
will always earn less than its competitor. Given the bleak prospects of earning
a profit when competing against an entity that does not pay wages, neither the
FCL nor any rational decisionmaker will enter the market.
Notwithstanding the compensation entry barrier, a second barrier arises for
the FCL: the costs associated with creating a comparable athletic infrastructure
with the NCAA. Without an infrastructure (i.e., facilities, stadiums, and
coaches), the FCL cannot create a product, develop talent, or otherwise produce
revenue. However, the FCL faces another severe disadvantage in creating an

74
See id. art. 20.9 (explaining non-binding “Commitments to Division I Collegiate Model”); see also id.
art. 12.01.2.
75
See id. arts. 12.01.4, 12.02.2; see also id. at 222–23 fig.15-1.
76
See id. art. 12.2.5; see also id. arts. 12.02.10–12.02.11.
77
See id. art. 12.02.11.
78
See id. art. 16.01.1.
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infrastructure. The NCAA has long been protected from antitrust suits,79 and
that unfettered access to college-level athletes has allowed the NCAA to build
an unparalleled athletic infrastructure. Consider that in 2014, the forty-eight
NCAA-member universities in the five wealthiest conferences (i.e., the
Southeastern Conference, Atlantic Coast Conference, Big 12, Big Ten, and the
Pac-12) spent $772 million on athletic complexes.80 In 2016, some NCAAmember universities spent over $200 million to build new stadiums.81 In 2018,
thirteen NCAA-member universities spent $5 million or more for head football
coaches.82 Those same universities spent, at minimum, an additional $3.6
million for assistant head coaches.83 On top of the wage burden to compensate
the athletes, a potential competitor must spend an enormous amount in initial
outlay to build facilities, construct stadiums, and hire coaches. The true cost of
such an endeavor is hard to determine, but given the small sample of capital
spent by the NCAA and its member institutions above, an initial outlay in the
hundreds of millions, if not billions, seems imminently plausible.
In the same vein, the same NCAA regulations on compensation that create
an entry barrier for competitors create an exit barrier or switching cost on
college-level athletes. Where “the cost of switching is high . . . [individuals] are
thus ‘locked in.’”84 Traditionally, switching costs are attributed to customers as
part of a tying claim. Here, the switching costs or exit barriers apply to the
athletes when considering whether to join a competitor willing to pay wages, or
remain with the NCAA, which does not. All else being equal, a rational
decisionmaker would choose to be compensated over not being compensated.
However, any currently eligible NCAA athlete who wants to join the FCL faces
a tough choice: receive compensation for his athletic exploits and be instantly
disqualified from competition in the NCAA, or forego compensation in favor of
competing in the NCAA. The rules are explicitly designed to punish and deter
athletes from deviating from the NCAA model. Consider the indefinite
suspension for running back Todd Gurley after he received $400 to sign
autographs85 or the four-game suspension for wide receiver A.J. Green for
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See generally NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Colleges Spend Fortunes on Lavish Athletic Facilities, CHI. TRIB. (Dec.
23, 2015),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-athletic-facilities-expenses-20151222-story.html.
81
See David Sirota & Andrew Perez, College Football: Public Universities Spend Millions on Stadiums,
Despite Slim Chance for Payoff, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.ibtimes.com/college-footballpublic-universities-spend-millions-stadiums-despite-slim-chance-2258669.
82
See NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY SPORTS, https://web.archive.org/web/20190420200000/https://sports.usatoday.
com/ncaa/salaries/ (last visited July 5, 2020).
83
Id.
84
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 476 (1992).
85
Tony Manfred, The Todd Gurley Autograph Scandal Is Everything That’s Wrong with the NCAA, BUS.
INSIDER, (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/todd-gurley-autograph-scandal-2014-10.
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selling a commemorative bowl jersey for $1,000.86 The list of suspensions for
relative pittances of money is nearly endless, and each suspension simply
reinforces the extremely punitive nature of the NCAA regulations. Since there
is no paid alternative to the NCAA with a comparable athletic infrastructure, the
only way for a college athlete to maintain his value to future employers is to
stay on the field and continue to produce. As such, an NCAA suspension for
impermissible benefits undermines an athlete’s chances at receiving
compensation from a professional employer. If approached by the FCL, an
athlete would have to weigh the compensation offered by the FCL against the
enormous switching cost associated with a finding of ineligibility by the NCAA.
As noted before, the athletic infrastructure of the FCL would likely be a serious
downgrade compared with the infrastructure the NCAA currently has in place.
In all likelihood, a rational athlete would choose to forego wages in an effort to
maintain eligibility and access to the NCAA infrastructure in lieu of wages and
an uncertain or lesser infrastructure from the FCL. In essence, the draconian
eligibility standards, combined with the NCAA’s hegemony and athletic
infrastructure, create such a high exit barrier that college athletes would likely
forego an offer of current compensation, lest the inability to access the NCAA’s
infrastructure destroy the athletes’ future wage-earning potential. In the
NCAA’s student-athlete model, they get athletes both coming and going.
To summarize, NCAA regulations create two entry barriers into the collegelevel athlete market due to the disparity in labor costs and enormous initial
outlay expense needed to create a sufficient athletic infrastructure. Similarly,
those same eligibility regulations place an enormous switching cost on college
athletes, creating an exit barrier and forcing college-level athletes to forgo even
the smallest amounts of compensation.
II. THE NCAA’S ALLEGED PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS DO NOT
OUTWEIGH THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF ITS EXCLUSIONARY ACTS
If an anticompetitive effect has been demonstrated, then the monopolist can
proffer a procompetitive justification for its conduct.87 “If the monopolist asserts
a procompetitive justification--a non-pretextual claim that its conduct is indeed
a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater
efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal--then the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to rebut that claim.”88 The balancing of the anticompetitive effect and
86
Associated Press, Georgia Star Receiver A.J. Green Suspended 4 Games for Selling Bowl Jersey for
$1,000, FOX NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.foxnews.com/sports/georgia-star-receiver-a-j-greensuspended-4-games-for-selling-bowl-jersey-for-1000.
87
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Eastman Kodak, 504
U.S. at 483.
88
Id.
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procompetitive justifications is akin to the rule of reason test used for Sherman
Act § 1 claims.89 The analysis is solely concerned with whether the conduct
promotes competition; other factors are relevant only to the extent that those
factors impact the competitive consequences.90
The NCAA recently defended itself against antitrust claims in O’Bannon,
where the NCAA’s regulations and use of student-athletes likeness were
challenged as anticompetitive conduct.91 In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit
considered two of the procompetitive justifications offered by the NCAA for its
restraints on student-athlete compensation as viable: that integrating academics
and athletics improves “the quality of educational services provided to studentathletes”92 and “that the amateur nature of collegiate sports increases their
appeal to consumers.”93 The NCAA recently faced another antitrust claim on
behalf of former NCAA student-athletes challenging the anticompetitive nature
of the NCAA regulations capping athlete compensation to the grant-in-aid
amount.94 In the NCAA’s brief for the In re: NCAA Grant-in-aid case, the same
procompetitive justifications are offered.95
In short, the Ninth Circuit held that the preservation of amateurism was a
sufficient justification to uphold the NCAA’s compensation restrictions, so long
as the grant-in-aid rules gave student-athletes the full cost of attendance: “The
Rule of Reason requires that the NCAA permit its schools to provide up to the
cost of attendance to their student athletes. It does not require more.”96
However, when applying the NCAA’s boilerplate procompetitive justification
to the anticompetitive conduct described in this paper, the outcome is clear: the
anticompetitive effect of the NCAA’s exclusionary cost scheme does far more
to destroy competition than to promote it.
First, the integration of academics and athletics is not a sufficient justification
on its face. The quality of educational services provided to the student-athlete
or the general relationship between student-athletes and other students are not
relevant factors; justifications based on considerations other than effect on
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Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1911).
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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See generally O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
92
Id. at 1059.
93
Id. at 1073.
94
See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 4:2014-md-02541 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
18, 2014).
95
See Defendants’ Closing Brief, In Re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 4:2014md-02541 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2018). The student plaintiffs obtained a limited permanent injunction
prohibiting the NCAA from “agreeing to fix or limit compensation or benefits related to education.”
Permanent Injunction, In Re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 4:2014-md-02541
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019).
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O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079. (showing the Northern District of California recently expanded upon
O’Bannon and determined that the preservation of amateurism cannot justify restrictions on compensation or
benefits related to education.).
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competition, like improved quality, do not impact the analysis. 97 Even if, as the
Ninth Circuit mistakenly found, that integration of academics and athletes to
improve educational experience was a valid procompetitive justification, the
positive impact on competition would not exist. Such a justification does not
reduce the entry barriers for competitors, it does not lower the price of
purchasing college-level athletics to consumers, and it does not reduce the
probability that the NCAA will continue to recoup monopoly profits. As such,
the proffered procompetitive justification of integration does not outweigh (or
impact at all) the anticompetitive harm caused by the NCAA’s exclusionary cost
scheme.
Second, the amateur nature of college athletics increasing its popularity
amongst consumers, while a stronger facial contention than the integration
argument, nonetheless fails as a sufficient procompetitive justification.
Assuming that the amateur nature of college athletics has a positive impact on
demand (despite the dubious quality of the evidence used in the O’Bannon case),
that positive impact misses the point of the analysis. As outlined above, the
NCAA is currently the only supplier of college-level athletics. The amount of
extra demand that the NCAA creates through the preservation of amateur
athletics does not imply that competition has been benefited. Instead, the
increased demand in a monopsony market merely causes the NCAA to reap
higher monopoly profits. By utilizing an exclusionary cost scheme to “preserve
amateurism,” the NCAA can maintain a monopoly price while simultaneously
increasing demand. Rather than greater competition, the only impact the
allegedly procompetitive justification has is greater profits. Much like the
integration justification, the amateurism justification does not solve or lessen
the anticompetitive effect of the NCAA’s exclusionary cost scheme. In fact, one
can argue that the procompetitive justification actually worsens the
anticompetitive effect of the scheme.
Much like the Board of Regents case, the O’Bannon case relies upon
outdated policy views on the value that amateurism and the student-athlete
model provide: “The difference between offering student-athletes educationrelated compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational
expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no
basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point.” 98
Both the Ninth Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s views on the principle of
amateurism seem to be clouded by a perception that amateurism, in and of itself,
is a noble goal and worthy of preservation. However, that reasoning misses the
mark entirely. The value of amateurism as a societal principle has no bearing
on the competitive benefit or harm caused by the preservation of that principle.
97
98

Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–94 (1978).
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078.
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As the Ninth Circuit points out, once student-athletes are paid compensation for
their wages, there would be “no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism.” 99
The response to that concern, as far as antitrust analysis is concerned, is “so
what?” The Sherman Act was not designed or intended to protect amateurism,
only competition. If the principle of amateurism destroys competition more than
it promotes competition, then that principle, when used in conjunction with
monopoly power, is a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Thus, the NCAA’s
exclusionary cost scheme, which already relies upon the amateur status of its
athletes to maintain monopoly power, is not saved by the alleged virtue of
amateurism.
III. THE SPONSORSHIP MODEL WOULD INCREASE COMPETITION IN THE
MARKET BY ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND THEREBY LOWERING
PRICES TO CONSUMERS
Since the NCAA’s exclusionary cost scheme violates antitrust law, a new
model must be instituted to replace the student-athlete model and to promote
competition in the college-level athlete market. One simple, procompetitive
model can be implemented with ease: the sponsorship model.
If the courts view the principle of amateurism as an idea worth preserving,
then the sponsorship model can provide a new system that maintains (to some
extent) the ideal of amateurism while promoting competition. Rather than
barring athletes from receiving any compensation beyond the grant-in-aid
requirement, the NCAA regulations could be modified to allow third-party
companies (i.e., Nike, Under Armour, Adidas, etc.) to compensate athletes
through sponsorship deals. Not all college athletes would receive sponsorship
deals, and those athletes would thus still be operating as an “amateur” as defined
under the old student-athlete model. At the same time, the third-party entities,
operating in an open market, would compensate athletes with sponsorship deals
commiserate with their market value. Additionally, the college-level athletes
would be permitted to participate and compete in third-party sponsored events
with other college-level athletes. Such a model reduces the anticompetitive
effect of the old student-athlete model in two ways.
First, the entry barriers and switching costs would be mitigated if not
eliminated outright. Rather than having to pay all the wages for the athletes, the
third-party sponsors are simply granting additional compensation to specific
athletes while the member universities still provide the grant-in-aid amounts.
Similarly, the third-party sponsors would not need to create an athletic
infrastructure; the athletes can still use the NCAA’s infrastructure for NCAA
competitions. Any third-party sponsored competitions would only need to rent
99
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out arenas or stadiums on a per-event basis, significantly lowering the initial
outlay costs. In the same vein, the exit barriers or switching costs under the
student-athlete model would no longer exist; if a third-party offers
compensation in the form of a sponsorship, the athlete can accept with no
negative consequences.
Second, the price consumers must pay for college-level athletics would
decrease with the increase in providers of college athletics. Third-party sponsors
can pick specific athletes and market a particular niche brand of college-level
athletics (i.e., the Nike All-Star League or the Under Armour Freshman
League). The variety and increased availability, as well as the lower costs
associated with the sponsorship model, would provide media rights buyers and
ticket purchasers more options at lower price levels. The monopoly profits the
NCAA obtained under the student-athlete model would now be disbursed
amongst consumers and athletes.
In the event that the sponsorship model does not lead to the positive
competition outcomes listed above, then a more drastic (but more consistent
with a competitive market) model can be implemented: the professional model.
Essentially, the professional model rejects all NCAA regulations on external
compensation, creating an entirely open market for college-level athletes.
Rather than bemoaning the conversion of college athletics into a professional
“minor league,”100 the change should be embraced as the natural progression of
a truly competitive market. Given that the appeal of college athletics is based
mostly on the consumer’s affiliation with the university rather than
amateurism,101 the negative impact that the destruction of amateurism has on the
demand for NCAA athletics would be outweighed by the proliferation of
competitors in the college-level athletics market (given that the NCAA’s
exclusionary cost scheme would collapse in such a scenario). In other words,
the number of consumers who would refuse to watch any college-level athletics
that do not adhere to the principle of amateurism would probably be outweighed
by the number of new consumers drawn in by the proliferation of competitors.
Both the sponsorship model and the professional model are far more
consistent with the Sherman Act than the student-athlete model. The only
negative, from the courts’ perspective, comes from the disintegration of the
principle of amateurism. However, if amateurism must die so that competition
can live, then the principle of amateurism must give way. The only barrier to
the implementation of the procompetitive sponsorship or professional models is
a misguided policy judgement on the value of amateurism.

100
101

NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102 (1984).
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059.
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CONCLUSION: THE NCAA HAS VIOLATED AND IS CURRENTLY VIOLATING
THE SHERMAN ACT
Little argument can be made that the NCAA’s exclusionary cost scheme (and
other exclusionary acts) have an anticompetitive effect; the leading NCAA cases
go out of their way to note that the NCAA has monopoly power and has used
that power in an anticompetitive way. At the same time, those cases tout the
benefits of amateurism as a totem to ward off antitrust claims. Despite the
obvious monopoly profits, entry barriers, and exclusionary tactics, the NCAA
remains mostly immune from the Sherman Act.
Of course, the judges deciding these cases all went to college; they likely
have fond memories of cheering on their college teams in a variety of sports.
However, those rose-tinted glasses should not blind the courts to the
anticompetitive nature of the NCAA. When the NCAA espouses the virtue of
amateurism, or the virtue of working without pay, on the one hand, and
denounces the scourge of compensation, while gorging on hundreds of millions
in profit, on the other, any procompetitive justifications ring hollow.
In summation, the NCAA’s exclusionary cost scheme violates § 2 of the
Sherman Act by accruing monopoly power through plainly anticompetitive acts
that benefit only the profits of the monopolist. No efficiency or pro-competitive
justifications offered by the NCAA are sufficient to outweigh the
anticompetitive harm caused by the NCAA’s monopoly. The only rationale
remaining is a flawed policy on the value of amateurism, a consideration that
has no place in antitrust analysis. The NCAA is a monopolist that jealously
wields its monopoly power to eliminate competition and increase profits at the
expense of the consumer and the athletes. Ending the NCAA’s monopoly is
right, both legally and as a matter of just policy.

